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Cet article examine les pratiques d’un échantillon de ménages ruraux en matière de remboursement de crédit, 
à partir de données collectées aux Philippines. L’analyse économétrique montre que les chocs subis par 
l’emprunteur et son créancier exercent une influence significative sur la durée de l’emprunt, mais qu’ils sont 
sans effet sur le montant du remboursement ni sur la probabilité que l’emprunteur bénéficie d’une remise de 
dette. Par ailleurs, les emprunteurs ayant subi les désagréments d’un choc tendent à rembourser leurs prêts en 
travail plutôt qu’en argent. Les intérêts versés sont souvent moindres que les intérêts dus ex post, mais ne 
sont pas directement influencés par les variables de choc. Enfin, les phénomènes d’asservissement des 
emprunteurs ou de surendettement ne sont pas observés dans la zone d’étude. 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines credit repayment among rural Filipino households, using survey data collected in four 
villages in the Cordillera mountains of northern Philippines between July, 1994 and March, 1995. We find 
that the timing of loan repayment depends on shocks affecting lender and borrower but amounts repaid and 
debt forgiveness do not. Borrowers occasionally repay debt in labor when faced with a bad shock. 
Contractual interest charges often are reduced ex post but reductions do not depend on shocks except through 
the timing of repayment. We find no evidence of loan roll-over, debt peonage, or labor bonding. 3 
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Risk is part of life. The way people and firms deal with risk therefore affects many aspects of 
economic activity.  This is true everywhere, but is particularly marked in poor rural economies 
where the magnitude of risk is larger and individual capacity to deal with risk is less Fafchamps 
1999b). Economic agents have devised a variety of strategies to cope with risk: transfers, 
precautionary savings, risk pooling, labor market participation, etc. (e.g. Townsend 1994, Morduch 
1995). We focus here on one of these strategies: borrowing. 
 
It is increasingly recognized that loans play an important role in the way people deal with risk (e.g. 
Rosenzweig 1988, Imai 2000). There are conceptually two ways by which loans can be used for risk 
purposes. First, individuals or firms can take up new loans when they have been hit by a shock. 
Fafchamps and Lund (2002), for instance, show that rural Filipino households borrow from friends 
and relatives when affected by income or health shocks. In anticipation of this, individuals or firms 
may set up networks of people who can help them in times of trouble (Banerjee and Munshi, 1999). 
An alternative way of achieving the same outcome is for economic agents to open a line of credit 
beforehand. Overdraft facilities are examples of such lines of credit. Fafchamps, Pender and 
Robinson (1995) and Fafchamps, Biggs, Conning and Srivastava (1994) show that overdraft finance 
is the dominant form of enterprise credit in Sub-Saharan Africa and that manufacturing firms rely 
on it to deal with changes in liquidity requirements. 
 
There is also a second way by which credit can be used to cope with risk: contingent repayment. 
Udry (1994), for instance, demonstrates that the repayment of informal loans is contingent upon 
shocks affecting lender and borrower. In a survey of manufacturing firms reported by Fafchamps et 
al. (1995), firms were asked how they deal with liquidity crises. One of the most often cited 
response was to delay payment to suppliers. Some firms even went as far as delaying payment to 
employees, but this was seen as a last resort action. 
 
Contingent loan repayment has been discussed extensively in the literature -- most notably in the 
literature on sovereign debt where debt repayment is often renegotiated (e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz, 
1981, Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz 1986, Kletzer 1984, Grossman and Van Huyck 1988). What 
remains unclear, however,  is how contingent repayment is organized. Is it through delay in 
repayment (debt rescheduling), reduction in repayment (partial or complete debt forgiveness), or 
issuance of new debt (debt roll-over)? Under what circumstances does payment in kind or in labor 
replace payment in cash? Do lenders take advantage of borrowers' difficulties to force them into a 
debt trap, sometimes called debt peonage or labor bonding in the literature (e.g. de Janvry 1981, 
Bardhan 1984, Srinivasan 1989, Genicot 2002)? 
 
These issues are the focus of this paper. We examine debt repayment practices among a sample of 
rural Filipino households. The data were collected from 200 rural households during three visits 
covering a 9 months period. Detailed information relative to all loans and loan repayment was 
collected. Data were also collected on shocks affecting respondents and their lenders. 
 
As Udry (1994), we find that loan repayment depends on shocks affecting both lender and 
borrower. But the form contingent repayment takes is not what is usually assumed, e.g., a reduction 
in the amount repaid. Our results indicate instead that debt rescheduling is the dominant form of 
contingency: borrowers delay repayment when they are hit by a shock, and accelerate repayment 
when the lender is hit by a shock. These results are consistent with Udry (1990)'s description of 5 
informal lending in Northern Nigeria. In contrast, when the debt is paid, the difference between the 
amount contracted and the amount repaid is in general small and need not depend on shocks. Debt 
roll-over is uncommon. Although some loans are made at usurious interest rates, we find no 
evidence of debt trap. There is, however, some evidence that debtors unable to repay in cash 
volunteer their labor as repayment. As far as we can judge, this practice does not seem to be 
associated with labor bonding in the survey area. 
 
The paper is organized as follow. We begin in Section 2 by providing a conceptual framework for 
contingent loan repayment. We examine the conditions under which debt peonage or labor bonding 
are likely to arise. Forms of contingent repayment are contrasted with the help of a simple model. 
We show that debts based on the continued voluntary participation in long-term relationships are 
more likely to resort to debt rescheduling rather than debt roll-over. In a perfect risk sharing 
equilibrium, gifts and transfers should be made to help pay off debts. Section 3 discusses the data 
collection methodology. A simple test of contingent repayment is presented in Section 4. A more 
detailed analysis of the forms of contingent repayment appears in Section 5. 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
To focus the attention on loan repayment, we consider a two-agent debt repayment game. 
Throughout, borrower and lender are denoted with the superscripts b and l, respectively. The model 
is recursive. Assets are ignored. The stock of debt at the beginning of period t is denoted Dt. During 
period t, borrower and lender each incur an income shock  { } l b i s
i
t , , = .
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i denotes the expected income of agent i. For simplicity, we assume that incomes are iid. Negative 




t ‡ + . This means that the borrower cannot repay in period t 
more than his current income. 
 
In each period, borrower and lender renegotiate debt repayment. We begin by assuming that the 
lender has all the bargaining power. We revisit this assumption later in this section. Repayment by 
the borrower is voluntary in the sense that agreeing to the lender's conditions must leave the 
borrower better off than breaking the relationship. We call breaking the relationship a default. We 
assume that, in case of default, the lender can credibly inflict legal and extra-legal penalties denoted 
Pt￿0. In general, these penalties depend on the stock of debt so that Pt = P(Dt+1) with P￿￿0. Legal 
penalties primarily take the form of court action. Examples of extra-legal penalties include recourse 
to 'loan enforcers' and exclusion from other social intercourse (Spagnolo 1995). If penalties are not 
credible, Pt=0 (Fafchamps 1996). 
 
With these assumptions, the model takes the form of an agent-principal model: 
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1 Consumption shocks such as sickness that requires health expenditures can be treated as utility shocks as in 
(e.g. Mace 1991, Cochrane 1991) 6 
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where the first inequality is the voluntary participation constraint and the second is the feasibility 
constraint. Parameters are the discount factors of the lender and the borrower, respectively. We 
assume that the borrower worries about starvation, i.e.,  -¥ = ﬁ ) ( lim 0 c Ub c . In this case, the second 
constraint is superfluous. Since the borrower's utility is monotonically decreasing in Rt and the 
penalty is monotonically non-decreasing in Dt, it is always in the lender's interest to choose Rt and 
Dt+1 such that the voluntary repayment constraint is binding. 
 
If P(D)=0 for all D, repayment is still possible but only if the lender provides insurance. Bulow and 
Rogoff (1989b) derive a similar result for sovereign debt. In this context, the optimal debt contract 
becomes fully contingent and resembles an insurance contract (Grossman and Van Huyck 1988). 
 
If the lender is risk neutral, the optimal repayment schedule is such that the borrower's consumption 
is constant. The expected gain to the borrower is an increasing function of the borrower's 
willingness to pay for insurance, that is, of his risk aversion. Only if the borrower is risk neutral is 
expected repayment 0 (Fafchamps, 1999a). If the lender is risk averse, the optimal debt contract 
resembles mutual insurance: when the lender receives a negative shock, repayment is higher and 
debt falls faster (Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 2000). 
 
When computing  ) ( 1 + t l D EV , the lender takes into account the possibility of future default. But in 
the model 2.1, it is never in the lender's interest to force the borrower into actual default. This is 
because we have implicitly assumed that the lender does not benefit from imposing the penalty. In 
this case, the lender's payoff is highest if he continues extracting regular debt repayment Rt from the 
borrower. This situation is what some have described as debt peonage: the borrower is 'prisoner' of 
the lender and obligated to permanently repay a never-extinguished debt. Note, however, that if 
P(D)  is 0 or close to 0 for all D, the lender must provide insurance to the borrower otherwise 
) 0 ( ) ( 1 b t b EV D EV < +  and default occurs. Only if P(D) is high enough can positive payments be 
extracted in all states of the world (Bulow and Rogoff 1989a). 
 
If the lender directly benefits from imposing the penalty, default eventually occurs. Let Q(Dt) be the 
lender's payoff if the penalty is imposed. Suppose that there exists a high enough Dt+1 such that 
) ( ) 0 ( ) ( 1 1 + + + < t l t l D Q EV D EV Then it is always in the lender's interest to set Dt+1 such that: 
 
  ) ( ) 0 ( ) ( 1 1 + + + < t l t l D Q EV D EV   (2.2) 
 
For any finite P(Dt+1), default is ensured by setting  Rt at the highest possible level -- so that 




t b - +  tends to -￿. In this case, the voluntary repayment constraint is violated and default 
occurs. Labor bonding -- i.e., a defaulting borrower becomes the slave of his lender -- is an example 
of such situation (Genicot 2002). The lender may also perceive a high utility from punishing the 
borrower out of anger or spite (Becker and Madrigal 1994). 
 
What the above discussion has made clear is that, without additional restrictions on the relationship 
between Dt, Rt, and Dt+1, the model instantaneously results in either debt peonage or labor bonding. 
This is because the lender has too much power. Restrictions on the relationship between Dt, Rt, and 
Dt+1 may come from various sources. Laws regarding usury and admissible contractual penalties for 
late payment set a cap on the speed with which the debt can rise. The lending contract may also 
specify beforehand what fees and interest charges are assessed in case of non-payment. For 
instance, if the maximum admissible interest rate is  r
max, then the lender faces an additional 
constraint: 7 
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If such a constraint is present, it is always in the interest of the lender to set 
) 1 )( (
max
1 r R D D t t t + - = +  since this maximizes future repayments. If r
max is high and Dt is large 
relative to what the borrower can pay, the nominal debt increases exponentially and eventually 
exceeds the value of all future payments the borrower can ever make.
2 When this happens, debt 
peonage or labor bonding again obtain. Societies may seek to prevent this occurrence by forbidding 
usury. 
Competition in the credit market also imposes limits on the speed at which debt can accumulate. If 
the borrower can borrow from other sources at a rate r < r
max, any attempt by the lender to impose 
r
max leads the borrower to borrow  Dt elsewhere at rate r to pay off his debt to the lender. This 
ensures that the borrower does not incur the default penalty P(Dt). In the perfect competition case, r 
is equal to the riskless interest rate plus a risk premium (e.g. Kletzer 1984,Grossman and Van 
Huyck 1988). As the borrower's debt increases relative to his ability to pay, the risk premium 
increases as well so that, even in a perfect competitive economy, an unlucky borrower eventually 
ends up as a debt peon -- not to a particular lender but to the collectivity of lenders. To prevent this 
occurrence, many societies have bankruptcy laws for corporations. Except for the US, however, 
most societies do not recognize individual bankruptcy, in which case past debts are never 
extinguished and debt peonage is legally possible.
3 In this case, debt is only extinguished by the 
death of the debtor.
4 
 
Having clarified the factors that affect the path of debt repayment, we turn to the debt contract 
proper. For a lender and a borrower to voluntarily enter in a debt contract, they must both benefit 
from it. For the lender, this means that  ) 0 ( ) ( 0 l l V D V ‡ : lending yields more utility. If the lender is 
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 The borrower must also agree to the contract. This requires that 
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where Vb(D ) internalizes the fact that, in some future state of the world, the borrower may want to 
default and incur the penalty (Fafchamps 1996). If repayment is too high, the borrower prefers not 
to borrow. The same occurs if repayment is insufficiently flexible so that default is likely, and if the 
penalty for default is high. By the same token, a contract with rigid repayment is not attractive to a 
borrower who faces a lot of income risk. A borrower may nevertheless accept a disadvantageous 
contract if he is very impatient (e.g., drug addict, compulsive gambler) or if he is on the brink of 
starvation, so that money today is worth much more than money tomorrow. For this reason, we 
                                                 
2 Examples of this kind of situation can be found in sovereign debt contracts when nominal debt is sold at a discount on 
secondary markets. 
3 To our knowledge, the Philippines do not have personal bankruptcy laws. 
4 In some societies, e.g., the ancient Romans, debt is inherited. 
 8 
expect poor people facing a lot of uninsured risk to voluntarily enter in debt contracts leading to 
debt peonage or labor bonding. 
 
This rapid overview of contingent debt contracting has taught us a number of lessons. If borrowers 
are risk averse, debt repayment should be contingent on shocks affecting the borrower. If lenders 
are risk averse, repayment should be contingent on shocks to lenders as well. If penalties can be 
inflicted upon defaulting borrowers, free debt contracting leads to permanent indebtedness (debt 
peonage) or to labor bonding for unlucky borrowers (Fafchamps 2003). Borrowers fall faster into 
permanent indebtedness if there is little competition between lenders or if there are few legal or 
customary restrictions on interest rates (prohibition of usury). If penalties for default are low, 
reversals of financial flows should be observed: fresh money should flow from lenders to borrowers 
when borrowers are faced with large negative shocks. If penalties are high enough, it is possible to 
observe unidirectional flows but contingent repayment is still optimal. 
 
These predictions all rest on the assumption that borrower and lender can observe shocks s
b
t  and  s
l
t . 
If shocks are not observable, lenders cannot condition repayment ons
b
t . Leaving repayment at the 
discretion of the borrower creates moral hazard, since it is in the interest of the borrower to falsely 
report shocks to abscond from repaying the debt. In this case, rigid repayment may be optimal. 
Another possibility is to give the borrower some limited discretion regarding the timing of 
repayment, e.g., to let arrears accumulate up a given ceiling or to allow delays of up to 60 days -- 
provided the borrower is in 'good standing', that is, has not abused this flexibility in the past. This 
discretion works like a line of credit or overdraft facility. It can improve upon a rigid repayment 
schedule by providing limited insurance to the borrower.
5 
 
Armed with the conceptual framework, we now examine debt repayment practices among rural 
households. Our main objective is first to assess whether debt repayment depends on shocks 
affecting lender and borrower. We then examine what form contingent repayment takes. Do 
borrowers delay repayment or is the amount repaid affected as well? In what form do they repay the 
debt? Is there evidence of debt roll-over? We pay special attention to any possible evidence of debt 
peonage and labor bonding. 
3. THE DATA 
 
Having presented the conceptual framework, we now describe the data. A survey was conducted in 
four villages in the Cordillera mountains of northern Philippines between July, 1994 and March, 
1995 (Lund 1996). A random sample of 206 rural household was drawn after taking a census of all 
households in selected rural districts. These households are dispersed over a wide area; most can 
only be reached by foot. Three interviews were conducted with each household at three month 
intervals between July 1994, just after the annual rice harvest, and March 1995, after the new rice 
crop had been transplanted. The data contain detailed information on debt and shocks. 
 
Data were collected on the characteristics of each household. Respondents were also asked to list all 
loans taking place within the last three months of each survey round. Great care was taken to collect 
data on all possible in-kind loan payments, including crops, meals, and labor services. The 
characteristics of each transaction were recorded. 
 
                                                 
5 Banks often operate in this manner. They typically combine a loan with an overdraft facility. The loan has a rigid 
repayment schedule, but the overdraft facility gives the borrower certain discretion in the timing of repayments. 9 
Information was also gathered on a variety of income and consumption shocks, such as crop failure, 
unemployment, sickness, and funerals. Events, such as sickness, that require the organization of 
traditional religious ceremonies are included as well. In addition, we collected an aggregate 
subjective measure based on respondents' own assessment of their financial situation. This measure 
combines m any simultaneous shocks and allows respondents to attach their own weight to 
particular events.
6 Responses range from -2 for very good to +2 for very bad. A similar ranking was 
obtained for a large proportion of partners in loan contracts. Data are available on each of 206 
households for three survey rounds (see Lund (1996) for details). 
 
Sample households derive most of their income from non-farm activities (Table 1). There are many 
skilled artisans in this area, and their wood carvings, woven blankets, and rattan baskets supply a 
growing tourist and export trade. Unearned income -- mostly land rentals -- is not negligible but 
very unevenly distributed across households, as is often the case with asset income. Although nearly 
all households operate their own farm, the majority do not produce enough grain to meet annual 
consumption needs. Sales of crops and livestock account for a minute fraction of total income. 
Surveyed households are net recipients of gifts and informal loans. 
 
The vast majority of rural credit transactions are composed of consumption loans between relatives 
and neighbors. Borrowing from formal credit institutions is rare: only 3.8% of loans in the study are 
from credit cooperatives, banks, or government organizations.
7 Because these loans  are larger, 
however, they account for 19.4% of new loans in value terms. Formal loans are mostly disbursed 
for production purposes. Store credit and advances from middlemen account for 28.2% of all new 
loans and another 13% of new loan value. These two categories of loans are likely to have a profit-
seeking motive. Together they constitute what, in this paper, we call formal loans. 
 
The remainder, which we call informal loans, take place between people who know each other well. 
In value terms, loans from relatives represent 72.5% of new borrowing (Table 2). Over 80% percent 
of informal lending occurs between households in the same village; virtually all others loans are 
taken from adjacent villages. Borrowers and lenders are well-acquainted: in nearly all cases, they 
describe each other as relatives or friends and in more than 85% of the cases, respondents were able 
to provide a complete accounting of the wealth holdings and demographic characteristics of all their 
loan partners. 
 
Participation in informal lending is widespread (Table 3). Only three households in the sample of 
206 were not involved in any informal credit transactions over the three survey rounds, while 92% 
of the households borrowed and 61% lent. Over half of the sample households participated in both 
borrowing and lending. Informal loans are not exchanged on an anonymous basis within a large 
community or market but rather through a network of personalized relationships. 92% of 
households have had credit transactions with their current loan partners in the past, and the same 
proportion expect to transact again in the future. Over half the households have reversed roles with 
their loan partners: current borrowers have given loans to their lender in the past and current lenders 
have received loans from borrowers. Obtaining credit in the future may thus be a motivation for 
extending loans today. Furthermore, repeated interaction seems required to build trust between 
                                                 
6 For example, one respondent whose spouse had been very sick paradoxically ranked herself better during the survey 
period than during the preceding one. When questioned, the respondent explained that a child got a new job, and that 
this happy event far outweighed the costs of her husband's sickness. 
7 The small percentage of formal sector loans in the study is consistent with other studies of rural credit. Udry (1990) 
and Udry (1994) finds that only 7% of loans in northern Nigeria are from the formal sector. Rosenzweig (1988) reports 
that 13% of loans in the ICRISAT dataset are from formal institutions. In a study of informal credit in Asia, Ghate 
(1992) suggests that up to 1/2 of all loans are informal in Thailand, up to 2/3 are informal in Bangladesh, and over 2/3 
are from informal sources in the Philippines. 10 
network partners: during the interviews, many respondents stressed the role of trust building before 
loans can take place. At prima facie, the model developed in Section 2 is thus well adapted to our 
study area. 
 
Most informal loans are taken for consumption rather than investment purposes.
8 Table 4 shows that 
the most common reason for borrowing is to meet immediate consumption needs. Only 17.2% of 
informal loans are used for investment purposes, mostly schooling. This raises the possibility that 
the primary motivation behind informal loans is to smooth consumption. Some gifts are motivated 
by the desire to repay for a previous loan. In addition, respondents explicitly reported that 5.9% of 
the loans were taken so that the borrower could give or lend the money to someone else. The fact 
that households act as intermediaries in transferring loans from one friend to another indicates that 
informal credit is not exchanged through a market system but rather through a network of personal 
contacts. The small proportion of relending nevertheless suggests that loan intermediation is not 
frictionless. 
 
Informal loans appear quite flexible. None have written contracts, less than 4% specify repayment 
schedules, and only 0.7% require collateral. Although 18% of the informal loans repaid during the 
survey period were not repaid in full, and 6% actually earned a negative return, in only one instance 
did a lender claim that a default had taken place. In the other cases both lenders and borrowers 
agreed to forgive part of the loan. By the same token, in 10% of all loans the borrower repaid more 
than the amount owed. Similar evidence has been reported by Udry (1994) and Platteau and 
Abraham (1987).
9 The majority of informal loans, nearly 86%, charge no interest. This feature is 
shared by most loans between friends and relatives around the world (e.g. Ben-Porath 1980, Zeller, 
Schrieder , von Braun and Heidhues 1993). For interest-bearing loans, the interest is calculated 
monthly without compounding. So, a 5% loan of 1000 pesos carries a constant 50 pesos monthly 
interest charge. 
4. TESTING CONTINGENT REPAYMENT 
 
As discussed in Section 2, current theoretical thinking about informal debt contracts revolves 
around the concept of contingent repayment. The work of Udry (1994) on Northern Nigeria rural 
lending is usually cited as evidence for it. Udry's work, however, does not distinguish between 
various forms of contingency, e.g., delaying repaying vs. partial debt forgiveness. In this section, 
we test whether contingent repayment occurs and, if so, what form it takes. We examine four 
dimensions of repayment: timing; amount paid; form; and amount remaining due. 
Factors influencing repayment are the amount of the loan still due and shocks affecting borrower 
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8 Loans from banks and credit cooperatives, in contrast, are given for investment purposes only. Kochar (1997) reports 
similar restrictions on formal lending in India. 
9 Given these features, one may wonder whether such transactions should be called loans or something else 
entirely, such as quasi-credit as in Platteau and Abraham (1987). What is important for our purpose is that 
respondents draw a sharp distinction between the two in that the obligation to repay an informal loan is 
regarded as much stronger than the diffuse obligation to reciprocate a gift. Quasi-credit is formalized in 
Fafchamps (1999a).   11 
 where L  is the loan amount given at time 0, r is the monthly interest rate, t is the time elapsed since 


















The appeal of equation 4.1 is that it lends itself easily to logarithmic transformation. As is clear 
from 4.1, Dt can be decomposed into three components: the original loan amount L ; an interest 
factor 1+rt, which is 1 for zero-interest loans; and St, the share of the total amount due that remains 
to be paid. In our analysis, we enter these t hree components separately and in log form. If 
repayment is proportional to Dt without difference across loan size and interest rate, all three terms 
should have the same coefficient of unity. A loan is assumed fully repaid if Dt￿0; observations with 
Dt￿0 are thus dropped from the sample. 
 
Regressors for shocks s
b
t  and  s
l
t are constructed as follows. Information on shocks affecting the 
respondent is available for each of the three survey rounds. Respondents were asked to rank their 
current situation relative to normal. They were also asked about a variety of specific shocks, such as 
disease, loss of employment, and death in the family. To reduce measurement error in the subjective 
ranking variable, we instrument it using specific shock information as well as individual fixed 
effects and village-time dummies. The instrumenting equation is presented in Appendix A1. 
 
Information was also collected on shocks affecting the other party to the loan contract, whether 
borrower or lender. This variable takes the form of a ranking from -2 (very good) to +2 (very bad). 
This ranking, however, is not available for all loan contracts. To avoid losing too many 
observations, we set missing partner shocks to the median of 0. 
 
To prevent the estimations being affected by omitted variable bias, we include additional controls 
related to the characteristics of the responding household and its partner(s). The vector of household 
characteristics includes the age in years of household head, the number of years of schooling 
completed by household head, a dummy indicating the male household head has craft or carpentry 
skills, a dummy indicating the head or spouse has a permanent job, the size of the household in 
adult male equivalents and the value of household wealth evaluated at the start of the survey. 
Information concerning the transaction partner includes the age in years of household head and the 
level of income. This latter variable takes the form of a ranking from 1 (poor) to 4 (rich). 
 
Three sets of regressions are computed. We first distinguish whether the respondent is the lender or 
borrower. If the respondent is a lender,  s
l
t  is the shock to the respondent while  s
b
t  is the shock to 
the other party. The reverse is true if the respondent is the borrower. We therefore expect the sign 
on respondent and partner shocks to switch when the respondent is lender. 
 
When the respondent is a borrower, we further distinguish between informal and formal loans. For 
memory, formal loans are defined here as all loans from shopkeepers and financial organizations.
10 
It is fair to assume that these loans are primarily granted for commercial reasons. Because most 
formal lenders are large organizations or businesses, the information on shocks affecting them is not 
relevant (as we expect these lenders to be approximately risk neutral) and is consequently missing 
for nearly all formal loan contracts. For this reason, the vector of regressors entering the formal loan 
                                                 
10 A small number of land mortgages are also included in the formal loan category. 
 12 
regressions only includes information on borrowers. When lending is part of business, we expect 
that lenders display less flexibility and insist on timely payment. 
 
Informal loans are all loans among individuals and are generally not granted with a profit motive. In 




We begin by examining the number of months elapsed between the time at which the loan was 
granted and the time in which it was repaid. The timing of repayment is analyzed via a duration 
model. The hazard repayment function describes the borrower's conditional propensity to repay. 
One way of making repayment contingent on shocks is simply to let the borrower repay late. 
Results are presented  in Table 5. Two estimators are computed: a parametric Weibull duration 
model, and a semi-parametric Cox model. The Weibull model imposes a parametric functional form 
on the hazard; the Cox model does not. 
    When the respondent is the borrower, results by and large conform with expectations: shocks 
affecting borrowers  s
b
t   delay repayment while shocks affecting informal lenders  s
l
t   speed up 
repayment. The magnitude of the effect is broadly similar across the Weibull and Cox models, 
albeit the borrower shock is not significant for informal loans in the Cox model. When the 
respondent is the lender, shock variables are never significant. 
 
We find that large loans and loans bearing interest tend to be paid more slowly. This is true for all 
categories of loans. At the same time, borrowers are more likely to pay when St is large, that is, 
when the loan is still due in full. We also find that formal loans are repaid faster than informal ones. 
The fact that loans bearing interest are repaid more slowly is a priori puzzling: delaying increases 
the interest charge so that it would be in the borrower's interest to speed up repayment. As we shall 
see below, interest charges often are renegotiated ex post so that delaying need not carry much 
penalty. Other results of interest show that certain categories of borrowers (older, better educated 
and wealthier) tend to repay faster. 
 
The results presented in Table 5 may be affected by unobservable individual effects. This is 
particularly true for amount due and interest rate: if unreliable borrowers are also those that 
accumulate large, interest-bearing debt, the negative effect of loan size and interest charges could be 
due to an omitted individual effect. To investigate this possibility, w e estimate two alternative 
models: a shared frailty model, and a 'fixed effect' model. The shared frailty model is roughly 
equivalent to an individual random effect model. We assume a Gamma distribution for frailty. The 
fixed effect model is estimated by adding individual fixed effects to the Weibull duration model. 
Results are summarized in Table 6. Controlling for individual unobservables does not affect our 
earlier results. Loan size and interest charge effects are not driven by unobservables: given a choice, 
borrowers first repay small, non interest-bearing loans. 
 
4.2. Amount paid 
 
Next we turn to the amount paid conditional on repaying. To this effect, we estimate a maximum 
likelihood selection model. The regressors entering the amount paid equation are the same as in the 
duration model. In the selection equation, we control for duration effects by including round 13 




Results are presented in Table 7 . The selection equation simply confirms earlier results. The 
propensity to repay a loan decreases with loan amount and interest rate; it also responds to shocks 
affecting lender and borrower, but only for informal loans when the respondent is borrower. In 
contrast, the amount paid equation contains some surprises. First, we find that shocks to the 
borrower never have a significant effect on the amount repaid, conditional on repaying. In the 
informal loan regressions (columns 2 and 3), the regressor even has the wrong sign. The amount 
paid responds to shocks to the lender in the informal loan regressions, however. 
 
Second, we find that the amount paid is roughly proportional to the loan amount Lt and the share 
due St, as could be expected. But in the informal loan regression the coefficient on the interest factor 
is significantly smaller than 1, suggesting that interest charges are not paid in full. We also find that 
the coefficient on Lt is significantly smaller than 1 in all cases, indicating that loan repayment does 
not increase proportionally with the size of the loan. 
4.3.  Form of repayment 
 
Next we turn to the form of repayment. In the area studied, repayment takes essentially two forms: 
cash and labor. To allow comparison, labor values were imputed by respondents.
12 Some 17% of all 
loan repayments take the form of labor. In all cases except 2, repayment within a specific survey 
round is either in cash or in labor. We therefore estimate a logit model of whether repayment takes 
the form of labor or not, conditional on repaying. The determinants are the same as before, except 
that we include round dummies to capture possible seasonal effects. Time elapsed since the loan 
was granted is also included to check whether payment in labor is more likely for old unpaid loans, 
a finding that would support the labor bonding story. 
 
Results are presented in Table 8. The estimator is logit.
13 Only observations with a repayment are 
used for estimation. The regression therefore captures the probability of repayment in labor, 
conditional on repayment taking place. For formal loans (column 1), shocks are not significant. In 
contrast, for informal loans (column 2), shocks to the respondent have the expected sign. 
Conditional on repayment occurring, a borrower experiencing a bad shock is more likely to repay in 
labor. The coefficient of partner shock has the right sign but is not significant. The evidence 
therefore suggests that payment in labor is substituted for cash payment by borrowers in difficulty. 
 
We also find that, for formal loans, payment in labor is more likely for large loans but inexistent for 
formal loans carrying interest. The latter category includes primarily loans from financial 
institutions that, by definition, are not designed to accept payment in kind. As far as formal loans 
are concerned, payment in labor concerns primarily shopkeepers. In this case, we have some 
evidence of labor bonding, i.e., highly indebted individuals providing labor payments. However, we 
do not find that labor payment increases over time, as would be suggested by the labor bonding 
model. 
                                                 
11 Both round dummies and time elapsed are non significant in the amount paid equation but jointly significant in the 
selection equation. They can therefore serve as identifying restrictions. 
12 This is a fair question since all loans are stipulated in monetary terms and respondents must have agreed with the 
lender by how much of the loan is reduced when they work for them. In a few cases when labor value is missing, we 
impute a value using the median wage rate. 
13  We also estimated a multinomial logit model with three choices: (1) not paying; (2) repaying in labor; and (3) 
repaying in cash. Identical conclusions obtain. We also estimated a fixed-effect logit model, but the number of 
remaining observations is too small for inference purposes (i.e., none of the regressors is significant). 
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A different picture emerges for informal loans. In this case, payment in labor is less likely for large 
loans. In those cases, payment in labor appears as a friendly way of reciprocating for small financial 
assistance. When the amount is larger, repayment in cash is expected. Also, payment in labor is less 
likely for old loans. What this suggests is that borrowers unable to pay on time volunteer their labor, 
possibly to demonstrate good faith. This explains why payment in labor takes place early on, not 
later as would be the case for labor bonding. 
 
Taken together, the evidence therefore suggests that labor bonding is not a feature of informal 
lending although the possibility of labor bonding cannot entirely be ruled out for loans from 
shopkeepers. This finding is in close agreement with the description of labor bonding and debt 
peonage made by (Geertz (1963) in neighboring Indonesia: it is a feature of the emerging market 
economy, not of 'traditional' rural society. 
 
Other results of interest in the informal loan regressions show that the wealth of borrower and 
lender affect the probability of repayment in labor in opposite direction. Conditional on repayment 
taking place, repayment in labor is less likely for rich borrowers, while rich lenders are more likely 
to be repaid in labor. 
4.4.  Debt forgiveness 
 
So far we have examined actual debt repayment. There remains the possibility that borrowers who 
face a bad shock are simply dispensed from repaying a loan or from repaying it in full. To examine 
this possibility, we make use of information collected at the end of the survey. Respondents were 
asked the amount remaining due on each individual loan. We call the amount the implicit debt and 
denote it Ù. For 42% of the loans, Ù=0. Other loans have remaining balances. The debt forgiveness 







= f  
 
 where L is the loan principal and D is the amount due as stipulated in the contract -- the 'contractual 
debt' -- obtained from equation 4.1. 
 
In 13% of the cases, f is negative: the borrower paid more than was stipulated in the contract. In 
63% of the loans, D=Ù so that the contractual debt matches exactly the amount considered due by 
respondents at the end of round 3. In the remaining 24% of cases, the contractual debt is higher than 
what respondent thinks has to be paid. In most cases the difference is a small proportion of the 
principal. But for 10% of the loans, the difference exceeds 50% of the principal. Of course, part of 
the discrepancy between our estimate of the contractual debt and the amount respondents consider 
due may be driven by error of measurement: our measure of f is noisy. This is why we need a 
statistical approach. 
 
We now investigate whether  f responds to shocks by regressing it on shocks and the three 
components of D. Regression results are presented in Table 9. Shock variables are not significant in 
any of the regressions. In the informal loan regressions, one variable dominates the results: the 
interest factor 1+rt. In two out of three regressions, the time elapsed since the loan was granted is 
significant as well, suggesting that unpaid loans become 'forgiven' as time passes -- at least in the 
eyes of respondents. To ensure that these results are not driven by misunderstandings regarding 
contract terms, we repeat the analysis using only the 42% of all loans that are considered fully 
repaid. Virtually identical results obtain. We omit these results here for lack of space. 15 
 
What the evidence therefore suggests is that for informal loans debt forgiveness is primarily driven 
by the renegotiation of interest charges. This is further confirmed by conducting a simple t-test on f 
between zero-interest loans and interest-bearing loans. The average f is 0.04 and 0.30 without and 
with interest, respectively. The difference is strongly significant, with a t-statistic of 14.8 and a p-
value of 0.0000. Put differently, while borrowers pay zero-interest loan with only very minor debt 
forgiveness on average, in most cases they fail to pay contractual interest. If we limit our analysis to 
zero-interest loans only, only one variable is significant across all regressions: the time elapsed 
since the loan was granted, meaning that old unpaid loans are considered forgiven. 
 
These findings contradict the debt peonage model presented in Section 2: if lenders were using 
accumulated interest to push borrowers further into debt, they would not systematically reduce 
interest charges ex post. On the contrary, they would add to those charges in the hope of making 
debt peonage irreversible. 
4.5.  Future lending 
 
Before concluding, we examine the data for evidence of debt roll-over and over-accumulation of 
debt. If debt were used to gain economic power over others, the analysis presented in Section 1 
would lead us to expect heavily indebted individuals to borrow ever more, hence falling into a debt 
trap. In contrast, if debt peonage is not part of lenders' strategy, we expect them to refrain from 
lending to individuals who already owe them a lot of money. By the same token, they should be 
reluctant to lend to individuals who have taken a long time to pay previous debt and who have 
already been charged high interest rates in the past. 
 
For each loan received, respondents were asked at the end of round 3 whether the lender would be 
willing to lend them more. For each loan given, on the other hand, respondents were asked whether 
they would be willing to lend more to the borrower. Overall, some 61% said they would be able to 
borrow more if they wanted to and 63% said they would agree to lend more if they were asked to. 
To investigate whether loans tend to snowball, we regress respondents' expectations of future 
lending on the amount they still owe, the contractual interest rate in their current loan, and the time 
elapsed since the current loan was granted. Fafchamps and Lund (2002) show that lending often 
plays an insurance role. To allow for this possibility, we also control for shocks. Loan forgiveness ö 
is included as regressor as well. If lending is driven by a profit motive, we expect lenders to refrain 
from lending to individuals who fail to pay their debt in full. In contrast, if lending follows 
primarily an insurance motive, those who needed debt forgiveness in the past may continue to need 
assistance in the future. 
 
Results are presented in Table 10. Contrary to the debt peonage model, we find that the amount still 
due, the interest rate on the current loan, and the time elapsed since the loan was granted all have a 
negative effect on the expectation of future lending. This is true across all loan categories and 
whether the respondent is the lender or the borrower. This constitutes fairly convincing evidence 
that forcing borrowers into high debt is not the strategy pursued by lenders in our sample. It is 
consistent with the earlier finding that interest charges often are reduced ex post. 
 
We also find some evidence that shocks raise expectations of future lending, confirming the finding 
of Fafchamps and Lund (2002) that lending plays an insurance role. In the formal lending 
regression, respondents facing a bad shock expect to borrow more in the future. 
 
Finally, the amount forgiven on the current loan does not have a significant effect on expectations 
of future lending. The variable even has a positive coefficient in one of the regressions. If anything, 
this demonstrates that lenders are not 'angry' at delinquent borrowers. 16 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have examined the loan repayment practices of rural Filipino households. The 
literature on rural lending has documented a variety of debt peonage and labor bonding practices. 
Poor people facing bad shocks are forced to borrow from moneylenders and other strong men in 
order to survive, only to fall more or less permanently under their control. These practices are 
typically associated with usurious interest rates, repayment in labor, debt roll-over, and ex post 
renegotiation of payment terms. We already know that households in our study area borrow to deal 
with shocks (Fafchamps and Lund 2002). Furthermore, many of the practices associated with debt 
peonage are present in our data. One objective of this paper was therefore to formally look for 
evidence of debt peonage or labor bonding in our study area. 
 
In his seminal work on loan repayment in Northern Nigeria, Udry (1994) proposed another vision of 
rural lending as an insurance vehicle. Building upon the work of Townsend (1993) and others, he 
argued that contingent loan repayment is an important way by which poor households deal with 
shocks. According to this view, amounts repaid vary with subsequent shocks to lender and 
borrower. In contrast, Rosenzweig (1988), Imai (2000) and Fafchamps and Lund (2002) have 
shown that it is borrowing itself that helps households deal with shocks. This has resulted in some 
confusion, as it is unclear whether it is debt itself or debt repayment that serves an insurance 
purpose. A second objective of our research was thus to revisit Udry's claim and examine what 
dimension of loan repayment is contingent and which is not. 
 
We find little or no support for debt peonage in our study area. The only possible exception 
concerns the repayment of shop credit in labor, but shop loans seldom carry interest and we find no 
evidence of debt roll-over and increased indebtedness over time. Contractual interest charges, when 
present, are seldom fully paid. Lenders refrain from granting new loans to borrowers who have 
failed to repay old loans, or taken a long time to repay them. Taken together, these findings make it unlikely 
that surveyed households would fall in a debt trap.
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Our results also put Udry's finding in perspective. By unpacking loan repayment into various 
components -- timing, amount paid, form of payment, and debt forgiveness -- we were able to 
clarify the extent to which debt repayment is contingent upon shocks. Contrary to Udry's claim, we 
do not find that shocks affect the amount repaid or the extent of debt forgiveness. The effect of 
shocks is primarily through payment delays and repayment in labor: borrowers in difficulty are 
given more time to pay and allowed to pay part of the loan in labor, usually in the form of an 
'advance payment'. The two go together: borrowers work for the borrower when they cannot pay, 
then pay the remainder in cash at a later date. Debt forgiveness is present in the survey area, but it 
concerns primarily a reduction in interest charges. This is a far cry from general equilibrium models 
of contingent credit in which all insurance takes place through contingent repayment (e.g. 
Townsend 1993, Udry 1992). 
 
In view of the evidence, debt repayment practices in rural Philippines are not that different from 
what we would observe in corporate America. Borrowers in difficulty are given more time to repay 
but are requested to demonstrate their good faith in exchange for leniency. The main difference 
perhaps is that rural Filipino lenders, rather than force a borrower into bankruptcy or debt peonage 
by accumulating interest charges, choose to reduce interest ex post. This is a priori incompatible 
with pure profit seeking motive. 
 
Why Filipino lenders display such restraint remains unclear. One possible explanation is that 
contractual interest is not enforceable due to the informal nature of the contract. Insisting on full 
                                                 
14 The fact that lenders in the study area do not compound interest is another piece of evidence in the same direction. 17 
interest charges may be counterproductive whenever repayment is voluntary and based on an 
implicit long-term relationship. If this explanation were true, we would expected a difference 
between formal loans -- for which foreclosure is possible -- and informal loans -- for which it is 
problematic. Some support for this interpretation can be found in our study area. Another possibility 
is that lenders and borrowers follow redistributive norms of behavior (Platteau and Hayami 1996). 
They may be intuitively aware that any debt system in areas with widespread poverty, if unchecked, 
would naturally lead to debt peonage (Fafchamps 2003). Moral condemnation and other social 
pressure may prevent lenders from abusing their power, hence forcing them to consent ex post debt 
reduction. In this sense, the area of the Philippines studied here resembles more Africa than Asia. 
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Table 1.  Income, Gifts, and Loans     
(over a nine months period)     
       
    Mean  Coefficient 
Sources of Income  (pesos)  of variation 
  Non-farm earned income  15 178  1,77 
  Unearned income (1)  1 818  8,80 
  Value of annual rice harvest  5 596  2,49 
       of which, crop sales  226  3,45 
  Net livestock sales  254  11,22 
Gifts and Loans     
  Gifts received  5 394  1,71 
  Gifts given  2 569  2,56 
  Net gifts  2 825  3,72 
  Net informal borrowing  2 124  2,73 
       
  Net gifts and informal borrowing  4 949  2,40 
       
Number of observations  206   
(1) Includes rental income, pensions, and sale of some assets. (2) In 
terms of number of animals, fowl counts for 68%, pigs for 16%, cattle 
and goats for 1%, and other animals for 14%. The total average value 
of livestock is 2,605 Pesos and the corresponding coefficient of   
variation is 1.85.     
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Table 2. New Loans     
(in Pesos per household over the nine months covered by the three survey rounds) 
       
    Money flowing 
    in  out 
Total, in value  5383  1159 
Breakdown by source or destination, in value     
  With close relatives  6.0%  6.7% 
  With distant relatives  42.7%  65.8% 
  With friends and neighbors  18.9%  27.5% 
  With others  13.0%  0.0% 
  With formal institutions, etc.  19.4%  0.0% 
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Table 3. Participation in Informal Credit   
     
Participation during survey  Loans 
  Borrowed at least once over 3 rounds  92% 
  Lent during at least once over 3 rounds  61% 
  Borrowed and lent at least once over 3 rnds  54% 
  Borrowed and lent in same survey round  24% 
  Did not participate over the three rounds  1% 
     
Repeated Interaction   
  Repeated loans between rounds  92% 
  Switched roles in lending (*)  52% 
  Expect to borrow or lend again from at least   
  one lender  92% 
Number of observations  206 
     
Source: Survey data.  (*) Switched between    
lending and borrowing during the survey.   
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Table 4. Reason for receiving a loan     
(computed on the basis of informal loans over the three survey rounds) 
       
    Reason the loan was taken 
   
unweight.  weighted by 
loan value 
Consumption  72,8%  53,6% 
  To pay for household consumption  41,3%  19,3% 
  To pay for medical expenditures  20,8%  13,8% 
  To pay for funeral and other ritual expenditures  10,7%  20,6% 
       
Investment  17,2%  31,7% 
  To pay for school expenditures  10,8%  9,1% 
  To finance a business or farm investment  4,9%  11,5% 
  To apply for a job abroad  1,5%  11,1% 
       
Reciprocity  9,6%  14,5% 
  To repay another loan or gift  3,8%  6,9% 
  To give another gift or loan  5,9%  7,6% 
       
No reason  0,4%  0,2% 
       
Number of observations  854   
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Table 5. Propensity to repay             
(estimator is duration model)             
               
    Respondent is borrower 
Respondent is 
lender 
    Formal loans  Informal loans  Informal loans 
A. Weibull  Hazard  z-stat.  Hazard  z-stat.  Hazard  z-stat. 
  Loan amount  0,844  -4,33  0,736  -8,13  0,886  -2,00 
  Interest factor  0,038  -3,73  0,103  -7,34  0,069  -3,19 
  Share still due  1,619  1,66  4,140  2,75  3,893  1,85 
  Shocks:             
  Shock to respondent  0,814  -1,78  0,863  -1,66  0,852  -1,10 
  Shock to partner      1,269  2,02  0,774  -1,08 
  Household characteristics of respondent:         
  Age of household head  1,019  3,10  1,011  2,06  0,996  -0,50 
  Last grade completed by head  0,996  -0,18  1,028  1,76  0,984  -0,64 
  Craft skill dummy  1,290  1,89  1,059  0,55  0,925  -0,40 
  Permanent wage dummy  1,162  0,81  1,083  0,60  0,933  -0,29 
  Household size  0,951  -1,18  0,964  -1,26  0,976  -0,45 
  Wealth (/10,000)  1,021  1,02  1,057  3,05  1,001  0,06 
  Household characteristics of partner:           
  Age of household head      1,014  3,57  1,004  0,59 
  Income level      1,042  0,52  1,365  1,86 
  p-parameter  0,537  10,81  0,497  13,07  0,287  4,45 
               
B. Cox             
  Loan amount  0,879  -3,36  0,782  -6,49  0,906  -1,64 
  Interest factor  0,083  -2,77  0,170  -5,31  0,096  -2,62 
  Share still due  1,305  0,94  3,241  2,36  2,381  1,23 
  Shocks:             
  Shock to respondent  0,896  -0,97  0,904  -1,17  0,936  -0,46 
  Shock to partner      1,315  2,39  0,845  -0,73 
  Household characteristics of respondent:         
  Age of household head  1,015  2,43  1,009  1,75  1,002  0,20 
  Last grade completed by head  0,998  -0,08  1,028  1,75  1,001  0,05 
  Craft skill dummy  1,242  1,61  1,037  0,34  0,938  -0,34 
  Permanent wage dummy  1,112  0,56  1,060  0,44  0,911  -0,41 
  Household size  0,951  -1,21  0,978  -0,77  0,987  -0,25 
  Wealth (/10,000)  1,014  0,66  1,041  2,19  1,001  0,04 
  Household characteristics of partner:           
  Age of household head      1,010  2,71  1,002  0,29 
  Income level      1,050  0,61  1,262  1,37 
               
               
  Number of observations  639    1217    452   
  Number of cases of repayment  255    437    165   
  Time at risk  1631    3227    1248   
               
Dependent variable is time between the time the loan was granted and a repayment was made. 
Shock to respondent is instrumented (see text).         
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Table 6. Propensity to repay controlling for individual effects       
(estimator is duration model with Weibull distribution)         
               
    Respondent is borrower  Respondent is lender 
    Formal loans  Informal loans  Informal loans 
A. Shared frailty model  Hazard  z-stat.  Hazard  z-stat.  Hazard  z-stat. 
  Loan amount  0,791  -4,92  0,721  -7,25  0,804  -2,64 
  Interest factor  0,011  -4,31  0,067  -7,84  0,037  -3,18 
  Share still due  2,670  2,90  5,193  3,03  10,375  2,68 
  Shocks:             
  Shock to respondent  0,762  -2,05  0,804  -2,17  0,966  -0,20 
  Shock to partner      1,282  2,04  0,852  -0,62 
  Household characteristics of respondent:         
  Age of household head  1,026  2,58  1,015  2,11  0,999  -0,05 
  Last grade completed by head  1,004  0,14  1,037  1,71  0,982  -0,50 
  Craft skill dummy  1,135  0,60  1,072  0,49  0,823  -0,65 
  Permanent wage dummy  1,001  0,00  0,966  -0,18  0,865  -0,41 
  Household size  0,938  -1,03  0,986  -0,35  1,031  0,34 
  Wealth (/10,000)  1,033  1,10  1,046  1,89  1,048  1,40 
  Household characteristics of partner:           
  Age of household head      1,012  2,79  1,011  1,27 
  Income level      1,082  0,89  1,391  1,48 
  p-parameter  0,737  11,86  0,604  14,04  0,604  7,68 
  theta-parameter (frailty distrib.)  -0,779  -2,68  -1,417  -4,76  -0,219  -0,79 
               
B. Fixed effect model             
  Loan amount  0,797  -3,10  0,669  -5,95  0,728  -2,34 
  Interest factor  0,000  -5,85  0,026  -8,89  0,009  -3,34 
  Share still due  5,516  4,21  16,061  4,45  174,222  3,83 
  Shocks:             
  Shock to respondent  0,685  -2,10  0,696  -2,74  1,012  0,05 
  Shock to partner      1,296  1,90  0,769  -0,83 
  Household characteristics of partner:           
  Age of household head      1,006  1,12  1,021  1,77 
  Income level      1,119  0,94  1,137  0,38 
  p-parameter  1,134  20,79  0,867  21,47  0,978  14,07 
               
  Number of observations  639    1217    452   
  Number of cases of repayment  255    437    165   
  Time at risk  1631    3227    1248   
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Table 7. Total amount repaid             
(estimator is maximum likelihood selection model) 
         
   Respondent is borrower  Respondent is lender 
   Formal loans  Informal loans  Informal loans 
A. Amout repaid  Coef.  z-stat. Coef.  z-stat. Coef.  z-stat. 
 Loan amount  0,852  39,37 0,915  56,99 0,912  31,46 
 Interest factor  0,511  1,11 0,324  2,62 0,496  1,09 
 Share still due  0,536  3,52 0,854  4,31 0,738  2,04 
 Shocks:         
 Shock to respondent  -0,020  -0,32 0,022  0,63 0,122  2,12 
 Shock to partner    0,097  2,26 0,007  0,06 
 Household characteristics of respondent:       
 Age of household head  0,002  0,66 -0,002  -1,04 0,002  0,56 
 Last grade completed by head  -0,002  -0,16 0,000  -0,06 0,005  0,56 
 Craft skill dummy  0,022  0,28 -0,035  -0,85 -0,053  -0,75 
 Permanent wage dummy  -0,060  -0,59 -0,165  -3,07 -0,181  -2,12 
 Household size  -0,019  -0,83 0,011  0,92 0,000  -0,01 
 Wealth (/10,000)  -0,009  -0,76 0,013  1,92 0,015  2,01 
 Household characteristics of partner:         
 Age of household head    0,001  0,91 0,002  0,62 
 Income level    -0,043  -1,43 0,049  0,62 
 Intercept  0,418  1,77 0,466  2,92 0,163  0,39 
B. Selection equation             
 Loan amount  -0,113  -3,65 -0,207  -6,62 -0,083  -1,81 
 Interest factor  -2,646  -4,54 -1,818  -7,23 -1,580  -3,29 
 Share still due  0,359  1,57 0,899  2,99 0,829  1,92 
 Time elapsed since loan   0,159  6,55 0,146  8,16 0,031  1,10 
 Shocks:         
 Shock to respondent  -0,080  -0,63 -0,068  -0,73 -0,141  -0,85 
 Shock to other party    0,189  1,96 -0,280  -1,59 
 Household characteristics of respondent:       
 Age of household head  0,015  2,84 0,007  1,60 0,004  0,61 
 Last grade completed by head  0,010  0,59 0,024  1,89 0,003  0,17 
 Craft skill dummy  0,184  1,67 0,004  0,05 0,037  0,26 
 Permanent wage dummy  0,123  0,79 0,036  0,33 -0,104  -0,59 
 Household size  -0,030  -0,89 -0,021  -0,89 -0,010  -0,24 
 Wealth (/10,000)  0,006  0,36 0,038  2,30 0,000  0,01 
 Household characteristics of partner:       
 Age of household head    0,008  2,72 -0,002  -0,49 
 Income level    0,074  1,17 0,186  1,35 
 Round 2 dummy  0,028  0,15 -0,114  -0,81 0,319  1,35 
 Round 3 dummy  0,159  0,93 0,163  1,27 0,504  2,34 
 Intercept  -0,974  -2,75 -0,552  -1,65 -0,657  -1,24 
 arctan(rho)  0,298  1,90 0,144  1,06 -0,051  -0,06 
 ln(sigma)  -0,570  -10,92 -0,920  -25,65 -0,949  -15,64 
 Number of observations  645   1229   463  
   of which: uncensored  261   445   169  
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Testing proportionality to amount due 
 
   chi-square  p-valuechi-square  p-value chi-square  p-value 
 Coefficient of loan amount=1  46,41  0,0000 28,24  0,0000 9,19  0,0024 
 Coefficient of interest factor=1  1,14  0,2853 29,71  0,0000 1,22  0,2699 
 Coefficient of share still due=1  9,30  0,0023 0,54  0,4618 0,52  0,4701 
 Three coefficients are equal  4,81  0,0905 21,21  0,0000 1,88  0,3905 
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Table 8. Repayment in labor           
(estimator is logit; only observations with repayment are included)     
             
  Respondent is borrower  Respondent is lender 
  Formal loans  Informal loans  Informal loans 
  Coef. z-stat.  Coef.  z-stat.  Coef.  z-stat. 
Loan amount  0,895 5,12  -0,227  -2,00  -0,354  -1,89 
Interest factor  -1220(*)  -1,748  -1,04  -2,164  -0,45 
Share still due  -1,269 -1,47  -0,911  -0,70  23,324 (**) 
Time elapsed since loan  -0,121 -0,99  -0,149  -1,72  -0,152  -1,50 
Shocks:           
Shock to respondent  -0,150 -0,25  0,864  2,63  -0,822  -1,36 
Shock to other party    -0,219  -0,68  -0,049  -0,05 
Household characteristics of respondent:         
Age of household head  -0,016 -0,79  0,037  2,27  0,000  0,01 
Last grade completed by head  -0,188 -2,25  -0,069  -1,39  0,049  0,78 
Craft skill dummy  0,950 1,78  0,267  0,87  -0,636  -1,14 
Permanent wage dummy  0,672 0,98  -0,749  -1,50  -0,857  -1,16 
Household size  -0,352 -2,22  0,134  1,63  -0,134  -0,84 
Wealth (/10,000)  -0,202 -1,25  -0,302  -2,40  0,119  2,30 
Household characteristics of partner:         
Age of household head    0,011  1,06  0,000  0,01 
Income level    0,638  3,00  -1,884  -2,62 
Round 2 dummy  1,527 1,70  -1,146  -2,09  1,103  1,19 
Round 3 dummy  1,007 1,27  -0,358  -0,75  1,973  2,58 
Intercept  -4,820 -2,53  -2,625  -2,17  3,708  1,55 
           
Number of observations  261   445    169  
Pseudo R-squared  0,325  0,195   0,256  
             
(*) A positive interest rate perfectly predicts absence of payment in labor     
(**) A share lower than a half perfectly predicts absence of payment in labor    
Dependent variable takes value one if repayment in labor       
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Table 9. Debt forgiveness             
(estimator is OLS)             
             
  Respondent is borrower  Respondent is lender 
  Formal loans  Informal loans  Informal loans 
  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.
Loan amount  0,006  0,87  0,001  0,11  0,004  0,30
Interest factor  0,107  1,16  0,508  10,29  0,563  6,59
Time elapsed since loan  0,023  5,34  0,013  3,56  0,009  1,60
Shocks:             
Shock to respondent  0,022  0,76  0,008  0,37  -0,029  -0,62
Shock to other party      0,012  0,54  0,074  1,51
Household characteristics of respondent:         
Age of household head  0,003  2,01  0,002  1,87  -0,003  -2,01
Last grade completed by head  -0,002  -0,52  0,005  1,53  0,001  0,12
Craft skill dummy  0,016  0,63  -0,029  -1,42  -0,014  -0,32
Permanent wage dummy  0,045  1,28  0,043  1,58  -0,096  -1,86
Household size  -0,008  -0,96  0,003  0,54  0,005  0,45
Wealth (/10,000)  -0,005  -1,15  -0,008  -1,79  -0,001  -0,27
Household characteristics of partner:           
Age of household head      0,000  -0,23  -0,002  -1,07
Income level      0,014  0,91  0,071  1,68
Intercept  -0,178  -2,06  -0,170  -2,03  0,018  0,10
             
Number of observations  207   463   149  
R-squared  0,162   0,377   0,300  
             
Dependent variable is debt forgiveness ratio (see text).        
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Table 10. Expectation of future lending          
(estimator is logit)             
             
  Respondent is borrower  Respondent is lender 
  Formal loans  Informal loans  Informal loans 
  Coef.  z-stat.  Coef.  z-stat.  Coef.  z-stat. 
Loan amount still due  -0,170  -3,20  -0,089  -2,62  -0,122  -1,67 
Interest rate on current loan  -12,559  -1,76  -8,424  -2,78  -6,953  -1,03 
Time elapsed since loan  -0,189  -3,15  -0,175  -4,54  -0,152  -2,27 
Debt forgiveness ratio  -0,631  -0,65  0,486  0,83  -0,646  -0,59 
Shocks:             
Shock to respondent  1,235  3,04  0,113  0,46  0,686  1,21 
Shock to other party      0,271  0,97  0,913  1,08 
Household characteristics of respondent:         
Age of household head  0,003  0,19  -0,005  -0,38  -0,005  -0,27 
Last grade completed by head  -0,008  -0,16  0,074  1,88  0,109  1,55 
Craft skill dummy  0,045  0,13  0,001  0,01  1,370  2,54 
Permanent wage dummy  0,668  1,32  -0,064  -0,20  0,543  0,84 
Household size  -0,107  -1,01  -0,018  -0,28  -0,183  -1,24 
Wealth (/10,000)  0,000  0,00  0,023  0,44  -0,070  -1,18 
Household characteristics of partner:           
Age of household head      -0,012  -1,38  -0,014  -0,81 
Income level      0,184  1,06  -0,692  -1,33 
Intercept  2,856  2,55  1,988  2,31  4,446  2,53 
             
Number of observations  195   443   141  
Pseudo R-squared  0,147   0,126   0,236  
             
Dependent variable is 1 if respondent expects more lending from current lender in future.  
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Table A1. Determinants of Subjective Shock Measures    
      
   Coef.  t-stat.
 Acute sickness  0,419  3,628
 Non-acute sickness  0,191  2,818
 Ritual  0,774  5,205
 Unemployment (head/spouse)  0,113  1,101
 Unemployment (other member)  -0,195  -1,140
 Village-time dummies  Included but not shown. 
 Household fixed effects  Included but not shown. 
      
 Number of observations  618  
 R-squared  0,5715  
  